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Abstract
Even when given the exact same moral dilemma, equally rational peers,
colleagues, and friends will disagree about the right course of action. Pro tanto principles
are one way to resolve moral conflicts such as these. When broadening the conflicts to
real life situations, such as those seen in public policy, pro tanto principles prove to be an
extremely useful tool. This paper explores the difference between the way that the
individual interacts with pro tanto principles and the way that public policy interacts with
such a moral system. In the end, difficulties in public policy attempt to be resolved by
using this framework.
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Pro Tanto Principles in Public Policy
One still unresolved problem in the world of philosophy branches off the field of
normative ethics. When met with situations that have different moral outcomes, there
seems to be no decided mechanism for what to do. Even when given the exact same
dilemma, equally rational peers, colleagues, and friends will disagree about the right
course of action. Pro tanto principles, which will be defined later in the paper, are one
way to resolve moral conflicts such as these. When broadening the conflicts to real life
situations, such as those seen in public policy, pro tanto principles may be a useful tool.
However, the way that the individual interacts with pro tanto principles may be
substantially different from the way that public policy interacts with such a moral system.
Always having the answer to moral dilemmas would be incredibly useful in our
world; certain political conflicts could be resolved with ease, the rightness of an action
could be ascertained, and people could generally have a moral guide. But in reality
asking, “What is the right thing to do here?” is extraordinarily tough. Philosophers have
spent centuries attempting to answer just that, and there still remains marked
disagreement about which answer really works.
A popular solution to the problem of weighing conflicting moral situations is
utilitarianism; “by which action will the most good be produced?” In this view, goodness
is the ultimate moral principle and should be maximized. Whatever action produces the
most aggregate good would mean that that action is most right. Though this view aims to
be simplistic, it is quite difficult to answer what good exactly means and what population
good should aim to serve. W.D. Ross is the creator of a popular moral system that has at
its heart these aforementioned pro tanto principles. He finds the utilitarian resolution to
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be too simplistic and thinks that it over generalizes each person’s relation to
another.1Utilitarianism, to Ross, makes it seem like people are just beneficiaries or nonbeneficiaries of other people’s actions. Though he admits this is true, he believes
relationships are much more nuanced and morally significant than this. Human relation
entails promises, marriages, credit & debts; these are the foundations for the duties that
utilitarianism overlooks.
Different elements of relationships, like being married to someone, add another
consideration to moral situations. Sure, valuing the most good for the most amount of
people sounds good on paper, but to Ross there is a difference between what is right and
what is optimal. Maximizing the amount of good does not make an action in itself right.
Ross gives an example to highlight this point; If fulfilling a promise would produce 1000
units of good for A, but by doing some other act would produce 1001 units of good for an
unpromised B, then it isn’t necessarily right to go with B.2 Even though B does produce
the most amount of good, a promise was made to A and that changes what the action
ultimately is. Again if no promise was made, but A was a kind and charitable man and B
was a vile dictator, producing 1001 units of good still wouldn’t be the right action. The
right action is the one that processes all of the morally relevant features, like promises or
character.
To Ross, rightness isn’t determined by the positive/negative consequence of the
outcome (how much good results) as it is with utilitarianism. What is right is determined

1
2

W.D. Ross. The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) p.19.
W.D. Ross. The Right and the Good, p.34.
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by the weighing of prima facie duties (which will, for the sake of continuity, be called pro
tanto principles) and the recognition that not all principles can be concurrently met.
These principles and what they can produce for morality will be explored in the
rest of the paper. Two different philosophers, Bernard Gert and W.D. Ross, give their
own version of pro tanto principles that will be analyzed and later discussed in the scope
of public policy.

Chapter 1
Absolute Morals & Pro Tanto Principles
Pro tanto is a Latin term that means, “as much as one is able; only to that
extent.”3 Accordingly, agents can use pro tanto principles as much as they are able to
without any other present constraints. Pro tanto principles are distinct in that they differ
only slightly from absolute morals. Moral absolutes mean that actions are intrinsically
right or wrong regardless of the relevant features surrounding that action. One of the most
uncontroversial pro tanto principles (which will get this title because most important
philosophers build it into their analyses) is to not cause harm. If the practice of not
causing harm was used under the scope of absolute morals, then it would be a standalone
principle that would make causing harm wrong no matter what the situation. As a pro
tanto principle, though, causing harm would also be wrong unless there was a stronger
moral consideration at hand that would make causing harm morally optimal.
Consider a person who is in the middle of the street, talking on their phone and is
completely unaware of their surroundings. All at once, a massive cargo truck is coming

US Legal, Inc. “Pro Tanto Law and Legal Definition.” Fraud Law and Legal Definition
USLegal, Inc., definitions.uslegal.com/p/pro-tanto/
3
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towards them that will surely end in their death. A person can push them onto the harsh
concrete that will probably cause a few scrapes and bruises (a kind of harm), but will
ultimately be less deleterious than what the cargo truck would have done. The
consequences of not harming this person are so bad (death), that it is optimal to harm
them (a few scrapes and bruises) and thus violate absolute morality. Here it seems morals
can be non-absolute; there are some situations where we need to harm, we need to lie, we
need for the sake of common sense do things that on paper seem wrong.
In the cargo truck example, it was perhaps too easy to tell which pro tanto
principle could be undermined and weight assessment was relatively simple. But often,
humans are faced with more complex moral dilemmas and pro tanto principles conflict.
Consider my friend Charise, who has promised me she will come to my improv show.
She knows I need someone to come for moral support after all my family members forgot
to show last time. But ten minutes before Charise leaves, her brother cuts himself open
playing with the kitchen knives and because of where the wound is, it is very prone to
infection. The brother ultimately needs to go to the hospital and has no other means of
getting there, but if Charise takes him she will miss my improv show and forego a
promise. She is teetering between keeping her promise (fidelity) and not causing harm
(non-maleficence); she is tasked with weighing the emotional damage that will incur on
my behalf with the physical damage that will incur on her brother’s. What should she
resolve? The answer is blurry, and in fact she isn’t only violating fidelity if she takes her
brother, she is also causing me emotional harm. Equally rational people will disagree
about what to do here. Emotional harm and physical harm are assessed differently to
different people - which harm is more impactful is difficult to quantify. This is
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troublesome when considering that we are often met with cases far more impactful than
the one outlined here.
Though Charise’s correct course of action is unresolved, using pro tanto
principles at least allow her moral salvation. No matter what, if Charise did or did not go
to my improv show, absolute morality had shown her to do something wrong. Under this
application, people cannot really ever escape from doing the wrong thing. The pro tanto
distinction, however, greater allows for actions to be deemed ethically sound when
morally ambiguous situations arise. For anyone to be considered a moral agent or to
construct a society that considers all variables, absolute morals seem to be very limiting.
Considering that it is improbable that a person never lies, never even accidentally
causes any harm, or never overtly acts beneficent, it is evident why many prefer the
framework of pro tanto principles. In fact, a moral structure that accounts for relativity in
situations, like pro tanto principles do, is seen in many real world applications. In law,
when deciding the severity of a sentence, there are numerous ethical and practical
considerations accounted for to determine the degree of someone’s culpability. ‘Right’
and ‘Wrong’ are deemed as such only after paired against other relative evidence. At the
very least, our legal world involves much more complexity than judging something as
intrinsically right or wrong. Ross phrases this non-binary nicely, “In virtue of being the
breaking of a promise, for instance, it tends to be wrong; in virtue of being an instance of
relieving distress it tends to be right.”4

4 Ibid.,28.
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In sum, Ross views pro tanto principles as preferable to absolute morals because
of their flexible nature and consideration of consequences. His rejection of utilitarianism
is based on the little consideration it gives to the complexity of human relationships. Pro
tanto principles have their own set of flaws, which will be discussed in later conflicts, but
the main rivals to pro tanto principles are too limiting to Ross, and either leave out the
relativity of moral situations or the importance of relationships.
Principles in Action
Ross maps out seven prima facie duties that he believes all hold their own unique
moral significance. Though he doesn’t claim that the list is necessarily final or complete,
he divides the duties in the following way5:
1. Fidelity- Keeping promises
2. Reparation- Making up for past misdoings
3. Gratitude- Being grateful
4. Justice- Being fair
5. Non-maleficence - To prevent harm to others
6. Beneficence- Helping others when possible
7. Self- Improvement- Educating One’s Self
Of all these duties, Ross makes various distinctions for their significance. Some
duties build upon our previous actions; these are the duties of fidelity and reparation. The
frequencies with which we interact with these two duties are entirely of our own accord.
In order to keep promises, we have to have been an active participant in making them. In

5

Ibid.,21.
11

order to repair our past misgivings, we would have to have had committed a mistake in
the first place. These principles seem to be quite central to the person rather than to the
society. Being grateful and being fair (justice) are of a different sort; they can involve the
self but they don’t necessarily have to. Ross argues that it is a duty for a person to be
grateful when a service is done unto them – a certain moral politeness. That moral
politeness extends to the realm of justice- we have the duty to both promote equitable
happiness and pleasure and to prevent a disturbance in that equity. Along this line is the
duty of beneficence, which is a general ‘do good’ duty. At times, we have the unique
ability of bettering the conditions of others in the world and when possible (like when it
is of little or no cost) should do so. Similarly, when we can better our own selves in
intelligence, virtue or pleasure, we have the duty to do so (self- improvement).
Ross’ last principle is non-maleficence, which he believes to be more binding
than beneficence.6 It is more binding in the sense that it is generally more important to
not cause harm than to additively do well. Not causing harm is a duty that should always
be at play; we should not kill, not steal, and not emotionally inflict distress at all times.
This is more pressing than saving a life, helping a small business owner who was just
robbed, or giving emotional aid. Non-maleficence is proactive in reducing wrongness;
beneficence and the other duties are either proactive in procuring rightness or retroactive
in ameliorating wrongness. Proactive in reducing wrongness, to Ross, is most weighty in
its efficaciousness and the directness of the harm were it to be violated.

6

Ibid.,22.
12

Though his list introduces enough principles to bring about conflict mentioned
later in the paper, it is important to mention that they might not be exhaustive. There is no
principle for autonomy or for respecting others. For example, imagine you believe your
sister is harming herself by drinking excessively or doing drugs. You aren’t exactly sure
what is going on with her, but you want to employ the duty of non-maleficence. You are
aware that she writes everything down in her diary that she keeps bedside. A principle
that prevents you from taking her diary, invading her privacy and violating her respect,
would be useful were it the case that your suspicions were unfounded. Sure, you could
employ non-maleficence, and then it would be possible that you weigh non-maleficence
against your attempt to employ the duty of non-maleficence. But weighing nonmaleficence against non-maleficence in this case can be troublesome. A comparison
between harm incurred if privacy was violated and harm incurred if excessive drug doing
was going on may be weak in its ability to produce what principle should actually be
acted upon. Perhaps not having this description isn’t actually problematic, but for Ross,
who relies on deep reflection, it might result in trouble. Adding a principle of autonomy
would help you realize that maybe violating autonomy, a unique personal freedom to
choose what is best for one’s self, is more important than the harm that occurs. Nonmaleficence would not have to be pitted against non-maleficence in the other case, which
doesn’t seem to capture precisely what is going on. For this reason, autonomy or some
other principle should at least be considered.
The example of autonomy is to show that pro tanto principles may be flawed and
are capable of additions. Other philosophers attempt to give their own modifications or
proposals for pro tanto principles, but reaching a perfect solution is tricky. The role of pro
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tanto principles in this paper isn’t one of a perfect solution because of these reasons.
Rather, it seems to serve as an attractive resolve that is more able to undertake a variety
of morally complex situations than moral absolutes.
Ross believes that pro tanto principles can take on situations by process of
examination. If there is a situation in which more than one pro tanto principle is
applicable, a person needs to study the situation fully until an opinion forms about which
action holds more prima facie rightness7 than prima facie wrongness, as compared to
alternatives. The act that is judged to possess these qualities is the one that holds the
rightness and thus becomes a person’s actual moral obligation. Ross gives no ranking as
to what duties are inherently more pressing than others – each situation is independent of
each other. Even though he does add that non-maleficence is usually more binding than
beneficence it is not the case that non-maleficence is always to be chosen over
beneficence. This is due to the uniqueness Ross attributes to every moral situation.
Lack of structure
Ross says, “We have no more direct way of access to the facts about rightness
and goodness and about what things are right or good, than by thinking about them; the
moral convictions of thoughtful and well-educated people are the data of ethics just as
sense-perceptions are the data of a natural science.”8 A large part of his framework is
just thought, because to Ross, that is the data of morality. Since it is centered on
something so unquantifiable, though, Ross opens himself up to criticism.

Prima facie just refers to the principles 1-7 that were discussed previously which
are our prima facie duties. When one might be violated, then that becomes prima
facie wrong.
8
Ibid.,41.
7
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Upon honest reflection, Ross thinks that people should be able to intuitively
figure out which principles are both applicable and more pressing. He believes that those
who argue this point and believe that some sort of structured theory needs to be evident
instead have unnecessarily convoluted things. First, finding the actual rightness9 of an
act is almost impossible. Any action done has unforeseeable consequences and any
number of persons may be directly or indirectly affected. These consequences make it
hard to say in complete certainty what, in actuality, was the right thing to do.
Additionally, since the fabric of the moral situation is choosing one action over another,
then it is impossible to do both actions and see which one is better.
A person who doesn’t wear a seatbelt in a car and gets into a gruesome car
accident has made a decision that can produce a variety of moral outcomes. The person
who doesn’t wear a seatbelt may fly through the backseat in a way they otherwise
wouldn’t have had they worn a seatbelt. In this scenario, the person’s body goes on to a
very busy street10 directly affecting the driver who was hit by the considerable weight of
the person. Those who are driving by are faced with a gruesome and bloody image of a
body. People may be psychologically harmed by seeing a damaged body so vividly, the
driver will be physically injured, and everyone around may be late to a prior engagement
due to the traffic the accident caused. This is only the direct harm, but it may have
produced a variety of scenarios that don’t even seem related. A woman who has been
repeatedly late to work in the past may have promised her boss that for the next month,

Actual rightness and prima facie rightness are two different.
It is useful to employ examples that are within the realm of possibility. Often in
philosophy, highly unusual circumstances are thought of to support conclusions that are
supposed to apply to usual circumstances. This scenario is not an unlikely one.
9

10
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she will be on time. The accident caused the woman to be late to work, and thus forced
her to break her promise. Though the boss doesn’t fire the woman, they have a more
negative perception of her and her work habits; it negatively affects her relationship with
her boss, and ultimately means she doesn’t get her bonus for that quarter. Family
members of the driver will suffer because their loved one is experiencing a great deal of
pain. The driver hit by the body may have anxiety each time they drive in the future. The
list goes on, and its ability to do so is because of the nature of actions and their
consequences. Ross writes,
“ It is enough to point out that any particular act will in all probability in the course of
time contribute to the bringing about of good or evil for many human beings and thus
have a prima facie rightness or wrongness for which we know nothing.”11
Because certainty about whether one act is more, on the whole right than another
is difficult, judgments about morality end up being similar to judgments about beauty.
Judgments about beauty are generally unstructured; an art piece can be in some regards
beautiful and in others not beautiful. The conclusions made about the beauty of
something are not logically justified conclusions12. Some will think something is
beautiful, while others find it not beautiful. And that something might be beautiful in
some regards, and not beautiful in others. Similarly, the conclusions derived from moral
judgments are more or less probable opinions. They don’t need to follow a structure in
order ascertain actual rightness, because actual rightness cannot be ascertained with
certainty. However, prima facie rightness and prima facie wrongness can – something

11

Ibid.,31.
For something to be logically justified it must either be self-evident or it must have
been a valid conclusion from self-evident premises. Beauty is not self-evident because
many people disagree about what is beautiful.
12
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might be wrong in some regards and right in others. In the end, these dilemmas are
exercises in a person’s moral astuteness, so they depend on reflection and the ability to
weigh principles properly.
Weighing Principles

To Ross, an act is prima facie wrong when there is a reason against doing it, like
in the case of two competing principles. Acts are in some regards (prima facie) wrong
and in some regards (prima facie) right. Though balancing may not always produce the
most truly advantageous action, Ross says, considering the relative rightness of an action
is more likely to secure the most advantageous actions.
The moral rightness of an action is found by examination of the prima facie
rightness and prima facie wrongness. In the example of Charise, we would need to find
the balance of prima facie rightness over the prima facie wrongness for each action.
Whichever action holds a more charitable balance of prima facie rightness, will be the
one that become the morally right action. How we come to find and value the prima facie
rightness and wrongness of each action, Ross believes, lies in our intuitions.
Intuitionism
In the application of Ross’ pro tanto principles, a person13 needs to be able to
identify prima facie rightness and prima facie wrongness. Ross believes that the
mechanism by which a person apprehends this ability can be attributed to intuitionism.
13

Person, people, and moral agents are used interchangeably in this analysis. Though it
seems correct that even those who are not moral agents can be capable of intuitionism,
moral agents should be defined. I will be using Gert’s definition of moral agents: “Only
human beings are known to be moral agents, but not all human beings are moral agents.
Infants and very young children are not moral agents, because they do not understand the
rules. Older children who can understand some of these rules are partial moral agents.
People who are so severely retarded that they cannot understand any of the rules are not
17

In intuitionism, people intuitively have a set of fundamental duties that can guide
them into the right action given a certain situation. Intuitionism relies on a moral order
common to all of us and this allows for the discernment among pro tanto principles to be
innate. In this view, moral attitudes people have are actually less subjective than would
be expected. Moral attitudes are the result of a mental maturity that is gained by the
experience of life. This relationship between innateness and experience may seem
contradictory but can be explained with examples. Though intuitions are innate, they
mature in their innateness. IQ, a measure of cognitive intelligence is supposed to be the
same throughout the entirety of one’s life, only deviating by a significant amount of
points. In that view it seems intelligence is innate, but with the education and knowledge
that is accrued by time, it is evident that intelligence can be enhanced by experience.
There are capabilities that we are naturally endowed with, that can improve the more
exposed we are. Morality is something that all moral agents are equipped with
understanding, but they get better at applying it once they are exposed to situations that
test it. Children obviously can’t deal with moral complexity in the same way their parents
can, but they have the ability to deal with it within them by very nature of being a person.
This ability will come to light once the children have been exposed to a variety of
different moral situations.
Societies are often filled with a multitude of dissenting opinions and questionable
characters, so it can be difficult to see intuitionism as correct. Even though the world
contains a high degree of moral questionability, though, people still seem to be capable of

moral agents, and people who have such serious mental disorders that they cannot guide
their conduct by the rules are also not subject to moral judgments.”(p.27)
18

identifying wrongness14. Beating a child for no reason or committing rape are generally
accepted as wrong sometimes even by those who are the perpetrators of said acts.
Ross compares this gained moral order to mathematics in that they are both
agreed fundamental propositions in nature. Just as we come to find that it is the nature of
one and one to be two, we come to find that it is inherently right to keep promises. The
basic principles of morality are able to be known by this mechanism, and this aids in how
they are to subsequently be balanced against each other.
Other Pro Tanto Solutions
Ross is not the only one to formulate solutions that contain pro tanto principles.
Bernard Gert creates his own version that may help revive some of the flaws inherent to
what Ross offers. The two differ in many regards, but the similarities that will be
observed will be helpful in identifying what exactly is useful.
Bernard Gert’s different moral system is composed of: “moral rules, moral ideals,
and a two-step procedure, for deciding whether a violation of a moral rule is justified...”15
There are ten general moral rules Gert outlines that will become immoral actions if they
are violated or attempted to be violated without adequate justification:
1. “Do not kill

6. Do not deceive

2. Do not cause pain

7. Keep your promises

3. Do not disable

8. Do not cheat

4. Do not deprive of freedom

9. Obey the law

14

Exceptions can be made for certain cognitive deficits.
Bernard, Gert. Common Morality: Deciding What to Do. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007) pp.19–20.
15
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5. Do not deprive of pleasure

10. Do your duty”16

Gert groups his ten rules into the two categories of direct wrongdoing and
wrongdoing that would just simply enhance wrongness. The first grouping targets more
basic harms; it is wrong to kill, cause pain, disable, lessen freedom of, or deprive
pleasure. He believes, similar to Ross, that these rules would be generally accepted by
rational17 persons to be harmful and undesirable. The second group of rules indirectly
produce the actions that cause harm; it is wrong to deceive, break promises, cheat, break
the law, and neglect one’s own duty. Gert believes that all moral agents should know
these rules and be able to follow them with easy understanding.
Moral ideals differ from moral rules in that they are encouraged rather than
required. Though Gert doesn’t explicitly state moral ideals in the same way he does the
rules, he says that moral ideals prevent the harms that violations of moral rules can cause.
For example, Gert's 2nd rule is ‘Do not cause pain,’ which people in helping professions
explicitly seek not to do. Therapists or doctors work to eliminate or reduce certain
ailments of pain and thus embody moral ideals. While these ideals are certainly
encouraged (so long as they don’t involve an unjustified violation of a moral rule) in
Gert’s moral system, they are not required. Moral rules, in contrast need always be met
unless there is adequate justification not to meet them. Adequate justification is
determined by a two-step procedure; the first step is to ascertain what rule is in violation

16

Bernard Gert, Common Morality: Deciding What to Do. p. 2.
Let irrational just mean a person who is not making decisions that would be regarded
as in their best interest. (i.e. decisions that go against prolonging their life)
17
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in terms of its morally relevant features and the second is to estimate the positive and
negative outcomes of allowing the violation in the first step.
It is useful to show the two-step justification process in action. For example,
imagine a father is sitting at a very crowded pool and has just made a promise to his child
that he will get in the water with him in exactly ten minutes. But in eight minutes,
somebody is in dire need of CPR and the father so happens to have a certification (though
other people in the area also have a CPR certification). Moral ideals would generally
encourage the father to help the person who isn’t breathing, even though it would mean
directly violating the moral rule of keeping a promise to your child. Adequate
justification can be determined by the two-step procedure.
The First Step - Morally Relevant Features
In order to find out what rule is in violation, it must be done in terms of is morally
relevant features.18 For Gert, this includes a thorough examination of ten different
questions:
1. “Which moral rule is being violated?”19
This feature requires the agent to look at the ten rules that are given. Violating
some rules (like do not kill) will probably require more deliberation and thought
than others.
Case Application: First the rule in violation must be ascertained (in this case the
rule being fidelity). The ideal being violated is beneficence (were it not to be met)
seeing that the father is capable of saving the child and it is of little cost to do so.

18
19

Ibid.,58.
Ibid.,59.
21

2. “Which evils or harms (including their kind, severity, probability, the length of
time they will be suffered, and their distribution) are being (a) caused by the
violation, (b) avoided (not caused) by the violation, or (c) prevented by the
violation?”20
Not only are the different kinds of evils and harms being considered, but also the
specific qualities that make them different are being considered. It is generally
agreed upon that the kind of evil should be considered when making a moral
judgment. However, the specific quality of consequences (i.e. severity, length of
suffering etc.) is contented. Gert believes that what is relevant in this case is not
the actual consequences of evils or harms (for they may be unforeseeable) caused
by a violation, nor it is the intended consequences of evils or harms. Rather, it is
the consequences that were foreseen by the agent at the time of judgment are the
most relevant.
Foreseeable consequences largely rely on the beliefs, knowledge and intelligence
of the agent. Those that have similar beliefs, knowledge and intelligence will
foresee similar consequences.21 However, this doesn’t necessarily mean
foreseeable consequences are objective to Gert. It is expected that a normal adult
can foresee that putting a wet plug in an outlet might cause electrocution. It is not
expected that a toddler can foresee the same thing. Because of this, people are
able to make judgments about whether or not agents were capable of foreseeing
consequences.

20
21

Ibid.,60.
Ibid.,62.
22

Case Application:
Benefits of Allowing the Violation
-

A child’s life is saved

-

Father is preventing the harm that will be incurred if the child has to witness a
death.

-

The child is taught a lesson
Drawbacks of Allowing the Violation:

-

Weight of the broken promise on the child’s psyche.
These two lists might not exhaust the full benefits and drawbacks of
allowing the violation, and that is why Gert says morally relevant features may
produce an innumerable quantity of outcomes. However, the considerations
present are relevant to the decision at hand. The weight of a broken promise on a
child’s psyche doesn’t appear to overpower the potential loss of a life.

3. “What are the desires and beliefs of the person toward whom the rule is being
violated?”22
Desires
The desires of a person should be taken into consideration when deciding what
the right thing to do is. For example, physicians should account for patient’s
desires when deciding which course of action to take. If a patient23 desires to have

22

Ibid.,62.
Assume they are capacitated, that is capable of 1) understanding/processing
information about diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment, 2) weighing the relative
benefits/burdens/risks 3) applying a set of values 4) arriving at a decision that is
consistent (stable) over time, and 5) effectively communicating the decision
23

23

a treatment that doesn’t restrict their breathing, but has a lesser chance of a
survival rate, then that should be taken into consideration. Bioethics committees,
which offer consultation on difficult ethical decisions in medical cases like these,
do take into account the desires of the patients.
It may seem odd that someone would want to have a rule (especially one that
harms them) violated. Consider a case where a mother requests that her daughter
not tell her of the night she knows her daughter is bound to have. The mother is
aware that the daughter will engage in certain debaucheries- under aged alcohol,
staying up far past curfew etc. However, the next time the mother sees her
daughter, the mother asks the daughter, “How did your night go?” The daughter
did indeed, participate in an inordinate amount of debauchery and wishes to tell
the mom, but decides to deceive. The mother desires to be deceived, because it
gives her greater peace of mind. In other instances, though, the mother would
probably state that she doesn’t enjoy being deceived.
Beliefs
Beliefs include if the person toward whom the rule is being violated knows about
the consequences of their decisions.64 Beliefs are determined by the level of
intelligence and/or knowledge that a person is capable of. People have to consider
whether or not to violate a rule when it regards a person who has beliefs, the may
make them incompetent to make rational decisions. Depriving a person of
freedom, such as incarcerating them, would require more debate if the person in
question were inhibited due to serious lapses in knowledge.
Case Application:
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A child doesn’t have the same intelligence or knowledge of his older counterparts
and therefore his beliefs may be shaped. Breaking a promise to a child, even when
there is good reason to (a life is at hand) will be different than breaking a promise
to an adult who can better understand the situation and all of its consequence.
4. “Is the relationship between the person violating the rule and the persons toward
whom the rule is being violated such that the former sometimes has a duty to
violate moral rules with regard to the latter independently of their consent?”24
Parents and children have relationships with inherently different levels of
authority. Because of relationships like these, rules like ‘the deprivation of
freedom’ act differently. When a parent puts a child in time out or grounds them,
they are depriving them of their freedom. But this is of a different sort than if one
normal adult kept another (non-related) normal adult in a house and told them
they weren’t allowed to leave. Relationships are important, and some explicitly
involve one party violating moral rules without the consent of the others.
Case Application:
In this case the parent does, at times, have a duty to violate moral rules in regard
to his child. This is not applicable in this case, though.
5.

“Which goods or benefits (including kind, degree, probability, duration, and
distribution) are being promoted by the violation?”25
This feature applies when the fourth one does as well. So, when the relationships
are such that one might reasonably violate the other (by nature of the

24
25

Ibid.,65.
Ibid.,66.
25

relationship), the outcome of the potential violation must be assessed. A parent
might punish a child, and thus deprive them of freedom, for the sake of teaching
them a valuable lesson. But if they ground them for three weeks, and the child is
two years of age, the benefit being promoted by the violation might not even be
met. Children two years of age are not capable of understanding punishment in
the way that the ‘benefit promoted by the violation’ intends. For that reason, this
feature is in need of consideration.
Case Application:
The duration of a person’s continued life will be longer if they are saved from
CPR. Additionally, the practice of embodying moral ideals will occur. Practicing
moral ideals is laudable and has the ability to set moral precedence for the people
it reaches. Especially the child, who might be formed by the behaviors he acquires
from his parents. If he sees his father acting in a way that is morally productive, it
can possibly be a behavior that is mimicked.
6. “Is the rule being violated toward a person in order to prevent her from violating
a moral rule when her violation would be (a) unjustified or (b) weakly
justified?”26
Gert uses this feature to distinguish between unjustified and justified
spying/deceiving. Actions may be done in order to prevent further violations that
have weak justification27 but can’t be done for violations that have strong
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justification. Suppose a group of people were enraged after a new bill was passed
that would cause women to have significant barriers to reproductive healthcare.
This group chooses to protest, but plans to do so with bombs and other forms of
non-peaceful means. The policemen have reason to deprive people of their
freedom to protest to prevent this form of protest, which has weak justification for
how violent it intends to be. But, if the form of protest was to be peaceful and the
policemen were to prevent the protest, then the violation (deprivation of freedom)
on the policemen’s part would not have good reason.
Case Application:
Not relevant for this case in particular.
7. “Is the rule being violated toward a person because he has violated a moral rule
(a) unjustifiably or (b) with a weak justification?”28
This feature has to do with punishment- some have the duty to harm or deprive
others of freedom as seen in the fourth morally relevant feature. So, if the rule is
being violated toward a person in response to his unjustified violation, then that
should be considered. This is how incarceration works- the government can
deprive people of their freedom because they have unjustifiably or weakly made a
violation that caused them to be put in said situation.
Case Application:
Not relevant for this case in particular.
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8. “Are there any alternative actions or policies that would be morally
preferable?”29
If there are alternative actions or policies that involve no violations and (in
consideration of morally relevant features 2 and 5) result in similar harms and
benefits, then that action should be done instead of the action that produces some
sort of violation.
Case Application:
Perhaps there is a lifeguard on duty, who can perform the CPR. In the case of a
lifeguard being perfectly present and capable, there would be an action that
doesn’t involve a violation. If the father continued to commit this violation with
this knowledge, then justification would be more questionable.
9. “Is the violation being done intentionally or only knowingly?”30
The difference between knowingly doing something and intentionally doing
something is minute. Gert shows the difference here, “For example, a nurse may
be willing to administer morphine to terminally ill patients in order to relieve pain
even though she knows it will hasten their death, but with no other morally
relevant changes in the situation, she would not administer morphine in order to
hasten the death of the patient.”31 The nurse would do something even though she
knows there is a dire consequence, yet the nurse would not do that same
something in order for the dire consequence to occur. Administering morphine in
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order to have a hasty death occur is different than knowing a hasty death will
occur and still deciding to act in such a way.
Case Application:
Again it would be different if the father gave CPR to the person in need knowing
that it meant breaking a promise to his child than if the father gave CPR to the
person in need in order to not have to spend time with his child.
10. “Is the situation an emergency such that people are not likely to plan to be in that
kind of situation?”32
This feature is included for emergency situations that usually force us to make
extraordinary judgments. It is the case that we make judgments that we wouldn’t
otherwise in emergencies. Gert says, “. For example, in an emergency when large
numbers of people have been seriously injured, doctors are morally allowed to
abandon patients who have a very small chance of survival in order to take care of
those with a better chance. However, in the ordinary practice of medicine, doctors
are not morally allowed to abandon patients with poor prognoses in order to treat
those with better prognoses, even if doing so will result in more people
surviving.”33 The most pressing matters receive the greatest priorities, and thus
the greatest violations.
Case Application:
This case does involve an emergency and so, should involve an action that is
proportionate to what is at stake.
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These ten questions are capable of producing an amount of morally relevant
features that can’t really be estimated, says Gert.34 However, this helps as a general guide
in obtaining the morally relevant facts. With the case, at hand there are many morally
relevant features that apply. When the discussion of public policy begins, these morally
relevant features will also apply.

The Second Step: Estimating the consequences of everyone knowing that a kind of
violation is allowed and that it is not allowed.
Now that the first step has been completed, the second step comes into play. The
consequences of everyone knowing that a kind of violation is or isn’t allowed must be
weighed. Gert believes that, due to inter-subjectivity among persons, the word estimate
has to be used because preciseness may not be a given. Publicly allowing certain
violations to occur might make moral statements that come with even more sets of
consequences. This is why the second step accounts for many forms of harm in a way
that the first step doesn’t.
Case Application: The consequences of saying that the life of a person doesn’t
constitute enough justification to break a small promise to your child seem detrimental.
For one, the notion of being a Good Samaritan will be undermine. Also, it may seem like
intra-familial situations are more important than outside ones. While this is true in some
cases, it creates an everyman (or family) for himself mentality that is seemingly devoid of
empathy.
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Verdict
It doesn’t seem that this small promise the father made will cause great harm if it
is not met. Most people would think that the delayed fulfillment of the promise is not
even nearly as important as a person’s life. A greater evil (death) is being prevented at the
expense of a much smaller evil (temporarily violated fidelity, assuming the father will get
in the pool with the child directly after CPR).
Of course, just because the father isn’t required to follow the moral ideal brought
about by giving a person CPR doesn’t mean he has no moral holding in the situation. If
the father doesn’t help the person, he isn’t in a legal or moral sense liable to punishment.
His lack of subjection to punishment, though, doesn’t mean he isn’t wrong for not
embodying that ideal.
Requirement
It seems odd to see that moral ideals aren’t required, but can be used as adequate
justification for breaking moral rules, which are required. In the example before, saving a
child’s life seemed to be adequate justification. Because moral ideals can be strong
enough to overcome the responsibility to moral rules, Gert thinks it’s important to draw a
distinction between moral and utilitarian ideals. Moral ideals involve the betterment of
deprived persons while utilitarian ideals involve the betterment of persons who are not
deprived. This difference can be explained with the example of a firefighter and a
manicurist. A firefighter is acting on a moral ideal by having a profession that helps those
in need (through preventing further harm or harm altogether), and therefore provides
them some sort of goodness. A manicurist is acting on a utilitarian ideal, where
betterment is extraneous and only provides a good (beauty) to a person in want. Because
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utilitarian ideals don’t have the same moral power as moral ideals, they can’t provide
adequate justification. Gert says, “Providing pleasure for deprived persons counts as
following a moral ideal, but providing more pleasure for those who already have a good
life is following a utilitarian ideal.”35Moral ideals are very specific in that their nature is
to rectify disparity. That nature is what allows those ideals to overpower moral rules.
When moral rules are violated without justification, they are liable to punishment.
So even if there is a justification for violating a moral rule, if it is a weak one, it still may
be liable to punishment. If moral ideals are violated, they are not liable to punishment.
People can be criticized for not embodying certain moral ideals, like giving to charity;
they just cannot be subject to punishment. Punishment plays an important role in Gert’s
framework, because whether or not a violation of some principle should result in
punishment can be indicative of its status as a moral rule or moral ideal. Ross makes no
such distinctions.
Like Ross, Gert has his own criticisms of rival theories. Kant makes a claim that
“It is morally wrong for a person to lie to a hired killer in order to protect an innocent
person from being killed by that killer.”36 To Gert, this is a serious mistake; some
violations of moral rules are and can be justified. Even killing someone, when it is for the
sake of self-defense or the defense of a small child, has potential for justification. Rival
theories don’t allow for this, but Gert still finds it very important that the justification is
concrete and equally agreed upon. Once the two-step process occurs, the strength of the
justification and the degree of punishment can be assessed.
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1. When every qualified person agrees that the violation of a moral rule should be
allowed → Violation is strongly justified and no punishment should occur.
2. When every qualified person agrees that the violation of a moral rule should not
be allowed →Violation is unjustified and a person should be liable to punishment.
3. When qualified people disagree about whether the violation should be allowed
→Violation is weakly justified and should be liable to punishment for violating
the rule.
With these, a moral agent should be able to tell if their violation is subject to
punishment. If the violation is subject to punishment, then the agent knows that there was
weak or no justification. If the violation is not subject to punishment, then the moral
agent either violated a moral ideal or violated a moral rule with strong justification. With
this, Gert has created a very systematic approach of both how to obtain adequate
justification and how to assess its strength.

Chapter 2
Pro tanto principles seem to be worthy of a discussion: they are sometimes
preferable to less flexible alternatives, they contain duties that are morally fruitful for a
society, and they can help resolve morally complex situations. Though Gert and Ross
both offer a version of pro tanto principles, they have many differences that make each
account uniquely their own. I will discuss the flaws and benefits of each which will be
taken into a further discussion of the applicability of pro tanto principles in public policy.
The Principles Themselves
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Ross’ principles don’t only neglect other principles such as autonomy; when
considering all philosophers’ pro tanto principles there is marked variation. Compared to
Bernard Gert’s ten principles, Ross has three less. This might mean that Ross’ view
doesn’t have enough principles or that Gert’s has too many. Alternatively, it might mean
that they have agreed upon principles just expressed in different ways. When comparing
Ross and Gert, it is important to note that the crux of their disagreement is not what the
pro tanto principles are. Nor is it about how many should be included; neither of them are
confident that their lists are exhaustive. The majority of the conflict surrounding pro tanto
principles is the process in how they can be violated.
Gert V. Ross
Gert and Ross both have pro tanto principles at the heart of their moral systems,
but they differ exactly in what their principles are, and when they are required. Gert
offers the systemization that critics of Ross believe is necessary. Ross, on the other hand,
provides a system that depends more on thought than strict adherence to a two-step
procedure. Out of the two, Gert gives a preferable system, but Ross still lays important
groundwork that will contribute to the discussion.
Gert creates a distinction between ideals and rules, which allows principles to be
more clearly defined. Gert’s addition of an explicit guide to morally relevant features
help strengthen the ambiguity present in Ross’ version. Finding a solution to moral
dilemmas, of course, involves consideration of all the relevant features of the dilemma.
This is at the heart of what pro tanto principles are. But Ross’ version doesn’t offer
precisely what the features are or how to go about obtaining them. Though of course, he
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is certainly capable of doing such a thing and the presence of a list doesn’t conflict with
his system, Gert’s addition is helpful.
What Works
Gert and Ross both make positive contributions to pro tanto principles, but at
times one fares better than the other in their accounts. Considering the similarities and
differences of their versions, a productive task will be to find which parts of each system
actually work. Principles should be included if they are unique in the morally significant
content they contribute. Additionally, principles should be considered moral rules if their
failure to be met is viewed as immoral rather than irrational. All other principles that are
uniquely morally significant but not necessarily subjected to compliance should be
considered moral ideals.
What comes out of this section should be (1) all the principles that are true and (2)
the least amount of true principles as possible. Principles that just repeat themselves will
be eliminated so that the most precise ones can be discussed in the public policy section.
Finding the Principles
Do Not Kill
Gert includes a duty of “Do not kill,” which just seems to be a specific example of
the Rossian principle of non-maleficence. Do not kill, on Gerts account, serves as one of
“each of the other four general kinds of harms”. Killing is not a general harm, though.
Depriving of freedom, disabling, and depriving of pleasure cannot be placed in the same
category of ‘general harm’ as killing. Killing is a specific instance of the deprivation of
freedom, it is disabling, and it is the deprivation of future pleasure. Adding a rule like ‘do
not kill’ is similar to adding a rule like ‘do not rape’. Both are moral rules, but are moral
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rules explicitly and universally understood to be under the scope of ‘do not harm.’ ‘Do
not kill’ doesn’t seem like it works when compared to other frameworks, but it doesn’t
even seem to fit within Gert’s own framework, largely for being so dissimilar to the other
four harms in the grouping. Ross already foresees principles like do not kill and says:
“The recognition of the duty of non-maleficence is the first step on the way to the
recognition of the duty of beneficence; and that accounts for the prominence of
the commands ‘ thou shalt not kill’, ‘thou shalt not commit adultery,’ ‘thou shalt
not steal.’”37
For these reasons ‘do not kill’ should be eliminated and should be assumed to be under
the scope of non-maleficence.
Fidelity
Keep your promises (Gert), do not deceive, (Gert) and fidelity (Ross) are three
different moral rules and duties that can be condensed into one. Deception entails
misrepresentation, omitting truth, or just simply lying. If one fails to keep their promises,
then they have, whether willfully or not, lied. For example, if Charise promises me that
she will go to my improv show and doesn’t end up doing so because of her brother, she
has not kept her promise, has deceived me, and has broken fidelity. It is generally thought
that deception requires intent, but even though deception can have intent behind it, it
doesn’t need to. The receiver of a broken promise has been deceived, because they were
under the impression that a promise would be kept and had to live circumstances contrary
to that impression. They were also lied to, again, without malign intent or not- the
inability to keep a promise always entails lying and deceit. In the other way, every
instance of deceit and lying is also the breaking of an implicit promise among moral
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agents who rightfully assume that the interactions they engage in are honest ones. Of
course this is an implicit promise that only a moral agent involves themselves in, those
who can’t or blatantly don’t wish to engage in moral soundness probably don’t make this
implicit promise.
Lying, deceiving, and keeping promises are all different variations of the same
kind of wrongdoing. This makes them non differentiable, however, the kind of
wrongdoing they all point to is an important one. For this reason fidelity should remain a
principle while keep your promises (which is just the definition of fidelity) and do not
deceive (which is just a variation of not enacting fidelity) should be dismissed.
Another iterative principle Gert gives credence to is ‘do not cheat.’‘ Do not cheat’
does the very same thing do not kill does, though, and seems to also fall under the scope
of fidelity in a way that isn’t deserving of its own category. Gert says,
“Although closely related to deceiving or breaking a promise, cheating is a
distinct kind of behavior. The paradigm of cheating is violating the rules of a
game in order to gain some unfair advantage over others…” (44)
Per Gert’s words, cheating involves a violation in which one person uses their position to
further their end means. Unlike other rules, to Gert, cheating must be intentional because
it requires a willful form of deception. Cheating can occur in a situation like a game, but
it seems that a person who bends the rules of the game to unfairly gain an advantage is
just, once again, breaking a promise. Consider the case of a man who has just been tipped
off as to who will be the winning horse in the upcoming race. He gathers all his friends
and convinces them that betting on a horse will be a fun bonding activity. By doing this,
the man is increasing the sum of the pool he wins in the end. The horse he chose wins,
and the man takes home all the money. Yes, he has cheated but he has also very much
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broken a promise to his friends and to the society in which he is a part of. When people
go into a game, it is assumed that the only unfairness present is the inequity in skill, not
inequity in base knowledge prior to or during the game. So when a person willingly
violates this, they are breaking the promises implicit in engaging in social interactions.
The productivity of any moral system depends on a foundation of trust; if a person wants
to be a part of a society, they should always be assumed to mean what they say and to
gain advantages in only just or natural ways. From these assumptions, when a man
cheats, just as when he lies or deceives, he is breaking a promise.
Obey the Law
Gert’s ‘obey the law’ is a good inclusion when considering the moral agents role
within the institution they are a part of. In order for morality to occur, agents have to
agree to be morally engaged. This engagement occurs, in part with the law and the
premonition that agents will follow it. Certain times people are met with dilemmas that
impel them to break the law, but these instances should always be met with a resistance
similar to that of fidelity. Obeying the law is a promise to surrounding moral agents that
you are a part of a system that has morality built into it. This is how people can have
peace of mind in knowing that, though they might be robbed, raped, or killed, those
instances would be something out of the ordinary.
Do Not Deprive of Freedom
‘Do not deprive of freedom’ is a principle that Gert’s system has and Ross’
account wrongfully overlooks. This principle is unlike do not kill because it is not a
specific instance of harm. Inhibiting freedom is a unique from harm because it is not
always regarded as harmful. There are many times when restricting freedom, like putting

38

a child in a time out, is regarded as formative and productive in affecting the formation of
behavior (because of this, we could even go so far as to say that restricting certain
freedoms are a form of beneficence). Medicating a severely mentally ill person, who
would otherwise inflict harm on others, against their will is depriving them of their
freedom, but it not only keeps others safe, but them safe as well. Without the freedom
principle, there would be a less descriptive account of what is going on, and the weighing
of principles would not be as complete or accurate. Consider the process without ‘do not
deprive of freedom’ as a guiding force in the medical patient’s situation.
Non-maleficence would be the guiding principle on both sides and the problem of
pitting non-maleficence against non-maleficence would occur once more. It is acceptable
to put one principle against itself, but it may result in an incomplete weighing. Freedom
is a unique good that we possess, and so it is valuable in making the decision with the
incapacitated patient. For this, do not deprive of freedom works quite favorably and is
proven to be an important distinction.
Beneficence & Self-Improvement
Gert seems to regard beneficence as something not required of a moral agent, but
highly encouraged. Ross, on the other hand, works beneficence into his framework as
being required of the moral agent. Of the two, it seems Gert approaches beneficence in
the correct way.
Suppose there is a very active lawyer for the ACLU (who commits herself to
rectifying social disparity) walking home one day. On her walk home, she sees a row of
homeless people. Though she commits her life to the duty of justice and beneficence, she
bypasses the row of homeless people and heads straight home. She, for the very life of
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her, can’t will herself to act beneficently even though she is capable of it. She is not
enacting the duty of beneficence that seems to be required of her in the Rossian
framework.
Even though she isn’t enacting her duty, her failure to enact it won’t result in her
immorality, according to Ross. Unlike breaking a promise, or lying, the lawyer wouldn’t
be wrong in not being beneficent. She just wouldn’t be actively beneficent. According to
Gert, she is just not embodying an ideal that is generally encouraged. This seems to be
the approach that Ross is implicitly taking; beneficence, all things held equal, is laudable
and morally valuable. However, if it is not readily applied, a moral rule is not directly
being violated. It is plausible that this is why beneficence is the only principle that Ross
says is less incumbent than any of the others. In his framework, he maintains that each
moral situation is taken case by case but that generally, beneficence is less pressing than
non-maleficence. This may be due to its weakness when it is independent of other moral
considerations.
Because Gert and Ross seem to be saying the same thing about beneficence, it
seems accurate that beneficence shouldn’t be regarded as morally required of us. The
lawyer shouldn’t have to take care of the people she sees suffering. If it was required of
her, then there would be more of a moral infraction if she doesn’t. If it was encouraged of
her though, it would be more minute. Beneficence as an ideal serves to take away the
notable tension with principles like non-maleficence. However, there are instances where
being beneficent is the only moral option, and can be so without it being required of us. If
the homeless person were starving to death and the lawyer had food with her that she
wouldn’t otherwise consume, Gert would still view it as morally wrong to not give the
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food. There would be no punishment for the lawyer not giving her food; since ideals are
encouraged, though, failures to meet those ideals still hold wrongness. They just aren’t as
wrong as being the direct perpetrators of harm (non-maleficence), the moral deficit is
passive and thus not as worthy of being deemed a rule.
The duty of self-improvement, in a similar way, just isn’t as convincing.
Principles of benefice and self-improvement, by themselves, do contribute greatly to the
moral soundness of a person, but their non-compliance does not result in immorality.
Rather, failing to be beneficent or failing to self-improve is irrational. Ross argues that
seeking pleasure for others is just as important as seeking pleasure for the self, which is
why duties like self-improvement can exist. But making self-improvement a principle
imposes laborious expectations on us. People can choose to stagnate, or in rare instances
to regress, and that is a part of their personhood. Acting in this way should not violate
any principle. It appears that if self-improvement was a rule, rather an ideal we can chose
to aspire to, then deprivation of freedom would occur. Making something so central to the
self a moral principle, eliminates aspects of free will and does so wrongly.
Do Not Kill
Gert includes a duty of “Do not kill,” which just seems to be a specific example of
the Rossian principle of non-maleficence. Do not kill, on Gerts account, serves as one of
“each of the other four general kinds of harms”. Killing is not a general harm, though.
Depriving of freedom, disabling, and depriving of pleasure cannot be placed in the same
category of ‘general harm’ as killing. Killing is a specific instance of the deprivation of
freedom, it is disabling, and it is the deprivation of future pleasure. Adding a rule like ‘do
not kill’ is similar to adding a rule like ‘do not rape’. Both are moral rules, but are moral
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rules explicitly and universally understood to be under the scope of ‘do not harm.’ ‘Do
not kill’ doesn’t seem like it works when compared to other frameworks, but it doesn’t
even seem to fit within Gert’s own framework, largely for being so dissimilar to the other
four harms in the grouping. Ross already foresees principles like do not kill and says:
“The recognition of the duty of non-maleficence is the first step on the way to the
recognition of the duty of beneficence; and that accounts for the prominence of
the commands ‘ thou shalt not kill’, ‘thou shalt not commit adultery,’ ‘thou shalt
not steal.’”38
For these reasons ‘do not kill’ should be eliminated and should be assumed to be
under the scope of non-maleficence.
The division of moral rules and moral ideals, along with the use of Gert’s
adequate justification tool for possibly violating said moral rules, will be used in the
continuation of the discussion. The moral ideals will encompass principles that are
encouraged, like being good or improving one’s self, but not required. The moral rules
will include what is required of a moral agent: keeping promises, non-maleficence, etc.
Violation of a moral rule will be acceptable if another moral rule is, upon thorough
assessment of the morally relevant features, thought to be more incumbent in the given
situation. Additionally, violation of a moral rule can be acceptable if a moral ideal is used
as justification. All principles not discussed once more in depth can be assumed to be
found non-problematic (in that they aren’t untrue or a repeat) and will be discussed in the
next section.

Chapter 3
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One situation where moral conflicts are indubitably complex is in government. If
the legislative, executive, and judicial branch followed absolute morality they would be
required to not cause harm, not kill, and never lie. We know this is historically inaccurate
(and impossible), which prompts the question of morality’s role in government. The
government must act differently than a single moral agent, while in some ways acting the
same. Perhaps the government operates in a utilitarian way- the most good for the most
amount of people no matter the person. A parallel dilemma might occur for Ross though.
In a democracy there are children, veterans, and inmates; should all of them be treated in
the same regard? If the most amount of good for the most amount of people neglects to
account for the various kinds of people and the competing interests that go along with it,
then it seems utilitarianism might not meet the needs of public policy. This is where pro
tanto principles can be useful in the creation of public policy. Using Gert and Ross’
framework, I will propose a way to interpret some of the ambiguities, and create pro tanto
principles specialized for public policy.
As America’s existence stretches on, over time it has experienced different (and
more) racial, social, and economic dilemmas. Multiple courts and bodies are tasked with
cases that challenge immature and pre-existing ideas. Despite problems with the two
party system and American democracy in general, it is evident that America has become
better at assessing decency. Precedents have accumulated, historical context can better be
applied, and the educational diversity within the population has expanded.
America is a comparative baby to many civilizations and yet, in such a short time,
it seems there have been massive leaps made for social progress in American society.
These leaps are in large part due to the American commitment to better itself, and to be a
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place founded on certain moral principles. As America ages, and its population expands,
moral conflicts and precedents will continue to arise, prompting policy makers to ask the
same questions we do; “what is the right thing to do here?” A possible answer to this
question comes in modifying the pro tanto principles Gert and Ross have made for the
individual, to be applied to the scope of public policy.
Public Policy
In this paper, public policy will be narrowed to the scope of the United States and
will be loosely defined as, “made in response to some sort of issue or problem that
requires attention. Policy is what the government chooses to do (actual) or not do
(implied) about a particular issue or problem.”39 This definition alone draws some
similarities to the structure of moral conflicts. In every governmental decision, there is an
active choice of what should be done at the expense of what cannot be done. Charise
explicitly choosing to take her brother to the hospital40 to prevent her brother’s wound
from being infected was implicitly choosing to not go to my improv show. Much like
Charise, when the government enacts a costly but extremely peaceful foreign policy, they
are actively choosing the value of greater world peace and implicitly choosing to grow
domestic debt.41
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Public policy is quite multifaceted; policymakers42 have to make a variety of
policy decisions that can include categories like healthcare, agricultural, criminal,
educational, economic, environmental(etc.). Even these are just the domestic policies,
there are also foreign policies that need to be considered. The different categories of
public policy will add other moral considerations to the weighing of principles.
Trade Offs
Trade-offs are as attributable to public policy as they are to our own moral lives
as individuals. If you skip work in order to drive your mother home from surgery, you are
making a trade-off. You are foregoing the cost of not going to work for the benefit of
making sure your mother has successfully and safely arrived to her home. You are also
weighing pro tanto principles against one another. Say your boss really needs you to
come into your shift, and you promised that you would absolutely make it on this day at
this time. But then, your mother calls explaining that your other sister got into a car
accident and she has been at the hospital waiting to be picked up from her surgery. An
extraordinary situation prompts you to weigh pro tanto principles against each other. If
you go pick up your mother, then you are breaking your promise to your boss. If you go
to work, then you are not being beneficent and you aren’t exhibiting gratitude to a mother
that has done so much for you. The consideration of the value of your relationships
comes into play - the person who gave you life might be of different value to you than
your employer, just as Ross suspects. Though beneficence isn’t required of you, you

‘Policymakers’ can really mean a variety of things. Public administrators, legislators,
chief executives, and even private citizens have a part in balancing the interests of public
policy. When the phrase policymakers is used it may be interchangeable with government
since the two are inextricably related.
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decide that it adequately justifies skipping work and you choose to pick your mother up
from surgery.
The government similarly makes trade-offs and weighs pro tanto principles at the
same time when creating and executing public policy. If a measure were proposed that
would cost the government 8 million dollars, but would ultimately prevent the spread of a
disease that would wipe out the population, the government would be forced to make a
tradeoff between incurring debt (or spending savings) and indirectly causing multiple
deaths. They would forego having 8 million dollars in expendable spending for the
benefit of having the majority of the population survive. Consider the pro tanto principles
being weighed here. What if it was the case that the government only had 8 million
dollars and that would mean healthcare, incarceration, and the needs of certain
communities were being sacrificed so that one half of the population could live. Even in
this case, it still seems that the disease prevention would be beneficial, as it employs the
principles of beneficence and self- improvement.
Public policy shouldn’t be solely based on money, and if we look at current
policy, we can see that it isn’t. Many other motives and considerations besides purely
monetary ones are weighed concerning public policy. This element of otherness, where
decisions are made using more than one principle, is what makes public policy applicable
to the structure of pro tanto principles. Different kinds of communities have different
interests that shape what is morally relevant to what is produced in public policy.
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Consider the debate surrounding Planned Parenthood43, an organization that
provides vital reproductive health care and sex education. Planned Parenthood receives a
good amount of government funding44, which is sometimes met with ideological dismay.
A man and woman have vastly different needs when it comes to reproductive health.
These needs ultimately require different amounts and kinds of resources in order to
achieve their end goals. Different populations have innately different needs that need to
be considered. Beyond these innate differences are the differences that occur as a
byproduct of democracy. Liberals and conservatives view this issue quite differently and,
for a variety of social and economic reasons, may or may not believe that government
funding for Planned Parenthood is misplaced. This is one of many examples in public
policy that show different communities (either innately different ones or different ones as
an exercise of democracy), have different competing interests regarding any one conflict.
Similarities between the Moral Agent and the Government in Moral Conflicts
It is impossible for a person to be in two places at once or to be able to predict the
future in such a way that tells them the morally optimal outcome (especially because for
all we know, the future is infinite). People work under the constraints of being human and
are thus only able to make decisions that adhere to those limitations. This is why
dilemmas arise; there are two (or more) possible avenues, each with their own moral
value, and only one action can be taken. The same goes for public policy, where
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resources are not adequate enough to meet all the demands of a growing society.
Policymakers operate under the constraint of time and money, and have to make choices
that involve sacrifice of certain moral ideals and principles in light of ones that are more
important at that time.
Differences between the Moral Agent and the Government in Moral Conflicts
It is evident that trade-offs are inherent to moral conflicts experienced by both the
moral agent and government alike, so where do the two differ? For one, there is an
obvious difference between a singular entity (moral agent) and something that acts on
behalf of millions of singular entities (government). We know that in the course of a
moral agent’s life, there will be times when principles are not adhered to. Even if we
enter into society under the assumption that the interactions we engage in are pure, there
will be moments that challenge our moral integrity. When Charise decides to take her
brother to the hospital to get rid of his infection instead of going to my improv show, she
(like all of us similarly might) violates a principle (even if it is considered to be justified).
Public policy, since it deals with dilemmas of much greater caliber and frequency, will do
this more often. They will violate principles in a way that if applied to a moral agent
would be unacceptable, but because of the distinctness and magnitude of their decisions,
it is allowable for them.45
Non- Maleficence
It was discussed that in both accounts of Gert and Ross, non-maleficence was a
more incumbent principle than beneficence, which moved beneficence to being regarded

Take the example of war. Agents aren’t legally (or morally) allowed to kill or inflict
pain, but under the safeguard of a government sanctioned activity like war, they are.
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as a less incumbent but still generally important ideal. Not causing harm is more possible
for the agent than it is in public policy, simply because of numbers. However, just
because it is more possible to cause harm, doesn’t mean it isn’t equally as important that
it doesn’t occur.
Not causing harm to certain populations, in the scope of public policy, is a bit
different. All things equal, it would be worse to cause harm to your mother than it would
be to your waiter because of the history of relationship you have with each of those
people. Public policy doesn’t take into account the same nuance in relationship that moral
agents do. However, it is tasked with accounting for nuance of a different sort. Should
resources be distributed evenly among veterans and inmates? What about children and
senior citizens? Or, should public policy make resource considerations for communities
the country has previously disenfranchised? Sure, public policy doesn’t have to deal with
the dilemma involved in personal relationships that Ross talks about, but it does have to
do deal with its own sort of complexity.
Reparation:
The moral agent needs to attempt to repair past misdoings- this fits quite nicely
with intuitionism. What is wrong and how we deal with it evolves as time goes on. In the
case of Charise and the improv show, she may have taken her brother to the hospital and
caused harm to her friend. But in the future, when her friend realizes that she has caused
Charise a great deal of emotional harm (even though Charise understood the reason for
missing the show), the friend can make it up to Charise for missing the show. Time has
passed, the brother has been taken to the hospital, and the friend can realize that
promising Charise they will go to the next three shows will make her feel better. Of
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course this is an example where wrongdoing was known. There are times when
reparation needs to occur because, upon reflection, something was known to be wrong.
At any moment a violation can occur on a personal or governmental scale. A
person could cheat on their partner or a government could disenfranchise a group of
people and unjustly take their land. In many instances, these things are done in ignorance,
though that does not lessen their impact. The government has a harder time than the
moral agent here not only because of the number of individuals it interacts with, but also
because of the time over which its interactions take place; a government’s lifetime is far
longer than an individual’s (perhaps infinite). The realization that wrongdoing has
occurred will be far more likely in the span of a government’s life.
Agents that existed during the time of slavery (and participated in its practice)
might have passed before slavery was normed to be extraordinarily horrendous. They will
never realize the wrongdoing and will thus never be eligible for reparation. However, the
government, which has had enormous changes in its moral and social norms over time,
will be eligible for reparation. This will happen even if those who act on behalf of the
government (policymakers), were not present for the action worthy of reparation.
Reparation may never be tantamount to the hurt inflicted in the primary offense,
but it is still good form to at least include it in these rules (and attempt for it in our
world). Reparation is unique in that it is retroactive. It can help provide accountability for
actions that were wrong in the first place or, more so in the government’s case, that were
wrong once standards of decency changed.
Justice
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For one, the individual moral agent puts its faith in public policy to rectify moral
infractions. Public policy, in turn, has the added duty of punishing the individual moral
agent who is in the wrong. Though public policy is made up of a collection of individual
moral agents, it has additive considerations. The collectiveness of its nature makes it a
more powerful body, which entails more responsibility. Unlike the individual moral
agent, the government must embed the purposes of justice in development of its moral
schema. For government even if no other consideration is present, it has to seek justice.
Justice, unlike reparation, can be proactive and retroactive and is a moral rule to
government.
Do Not Deprive of Freedom
There are many cases when depriving another person of freedom is considered to
be morally justifiable as laid out in Gerts fourth morally relevant feature. The government
is unique in that it is tasked with depriving people of their freedoms by the very nature of
its existence. By being an enforcer of the law, and thus an insurer of safety, the
government has to deprive persons of their freedom. The moral agent, if they occupy
certain positions like being a parent, or being a physician, justifiably deprive persons of
their freedom. But that is because they are occupying a role of authority that they
temporarily go in and out of. Not all of their interactions with other moral agents will
require them to act as an authority figure. At base, they are moral agents who are not
supposed to deprive other persons of freedom. In contrast, the government does not
occupy a role when it deprives their citizens of certain freedoms. The government is
simply being its essential self.
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Deprivation of freedom varies greatly from the individual to the government. It is
seen as far more acceptable for the government to deprive individuals of freedom than it
is for an individual moral agent to deprive other moral agents of freedom. This is because
of many reasons, a large one being that we see the government as knowing best, probably
based on our knowledge that it is comprised of many individuals, while we are one (and
have knowledge contingent on such). I take it Gert would agree to the uniqueness of the
government;
“When a government deprives one or more of its citizens of some freedom, that is
not the same kind of act as when one citizen deprives another one of the same amount of
freedom, even when the evils caused, avoided, and prevented, and the rational desires and
beliefs of the person being deprived of the freedom, are the same. Of course, both acts of
deprivation might be morally unjustified, but because they are not the same kind of act,
one of them might be justified and the other not. For example, a government might be
justified in forcing a person to sell his property in order to build a road, whereas no
private citizen would be justified in doing so. This feature makes it possible that
appropriate members of the government may be justified in inflicting harm on a citizen
when people without this special relationship are not justified in inflicting that harm in
what may otherwise count as the same kind of situation. This is an essential feature in
distinguishing punishment from revenge.”46
The deprivation of freedom, on the government’s behalf, can be seen as a form of
paternalism. Paternalism is defined as, “is the interference of a state or an individual

with another person, against their will, and defended or motivated by a claim that the
person interfered with will be better off or protected from harm.”47In this way, the
government is preventing us from causing harm to ourselves. Moral agents don’t have
the authority (unless occupying a role) to prevent another person from causing harm
to themselves. When the moral agent does this, then, it is more of a violation than
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when the government does. That is not to say that the government isn’t immune to
depriving the freedom of others in such a severe manner that it becomes wrong, but
they have more leeway in doing it in the first place.
Another reason to deprive a person of freedoms is not to protect them from
themselves, but to protect society from that person (like in prison). Gert’s seventh
morally relevant feature takes this into account. While the government can and does
pursue reasons of punishment like deterrence, retribution, incapacitation and
rehabilitation, the moral agent doesn’t. The moral agent resigns their hold on
retribution and gives that duty to the government.
Although depriving freedom is obligatory to the government, it is a principle
that is held to be the forefront of American ideals. “Innocent until proven guilty” and
other legal safeguards perpetuate this American and democratic sentiment. So, even
though the government may have to deprive persons of freedom more, they should
generally be just as resistant as the moral agent.
Keep Promises (Fidelity)
Oddly enough, it doesn’t seem that the government is subject to treating promises
the same way as the moral agent. This is because of the different relevant features of the
government. For one, a promise48 made between moral agents is usually a finite one. A
promise made between moral agents and a government, though, is one that is subject to
fickleness. Both the moral agent and the government know this in a way. Any policy is

Unless the promise is something of the sort, “I’ll love you forever.” In these cases,
these are either promises of deception or promises that are made where ‘forever’ means
until death.
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capable of being overturned, because administrations can substantially change every two
to eight years. The 401k, a promise the government has made, is not a promise that it can
foreseeably keep given constraints on resources and the increase in population. Even
more than this, the money that is put away is subject to inflation due to the fiscal moves
made by the government (either accidentally or knowingly). So the money a moral agent
thinks they will be receiving and thus the premise of the promise, won’t actually be the
same amount they actually receive. In a way the promise by the government isn’t fully
kept.
When campaign promises are made, moral agents (at least should) understand that
they may have been made as a means to win votes. Of course, deceiving the public in
order to get a coveted position is immoral. But consider the case of a politician (this isn’t
so much a case as it is a recursive reality) who promises things to moral agents that he
can’t follow through with because of resource deficits, states of emergency, or competing
interests held by a vaster majority of the population. When the moral agent begins to
engage in an interaction where a promise is to occur, similar problems can occur on a
smaller scale, but they aren’t expected. With policy moves, there is more of an
expectation that due to the nature of American politics, it is likely that promises are not
fulfilled in the way they were presented.
Obey the law
In order for society to endure, the moral agent must obey the law. By living in a
society, we are consenting to being governed. By that same token, the creators of public
policy must uphold the law. The government is something that we have agreed to, and
through agreeing have entered into a type of promise to follow its rules (as long as they
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are moral).49 Policymakers have a duty to not use their power as a means of abuse to
evade obeying the law. Public policy is sometimes seeded with actors who can be bought
out by wealthy private parties for interests that don’t have pure moral intent. This should
not be the case, even though it often is. The government should be expected to act like
the moral agent and obey the laws in an equal way. For the government, this means
engaging in the law in a way that promotes interests without corruptive infiltrates.
Upholding the law must be as strictly met as obeying the law.
(Social and Political Consensus)
This is a part of obeying and thus upholding the law. It is considerably immoral
for the government to act in a way that doesn’t consider the time or the growing needs of
a population. The founding fathers foresaw this problem and evolving standards of
decency were constitutionally created in response. If a measure is voted on, it is within
the governments’ duty to enact the policy in accordance with how it was voted.
Additionally, if social consensus leans towards something (like equal rights for the
LGTBQ community) then that must be upheld as well. To act or implement policies
otherwise would hold wrongness.
Beneficence
The moral agent and the government treat beneficence quite similarly. Both
ideally should act beneficent, but if additive good isn’t obtained it isn’t reprehensible.
Not being beneficent will produce defeatist attitudes among policymakers and those who
are affected by policy, but won’t subject policymakers to punishment (just failure). This
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This rationale comes from the social contract
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is a strong moral ideal that the government should strive to embody, but it remains as just
an ideal in the scope of public policy.
Self-Improvement
In order for a moral system to work for the moral agent, self-improvement is
desirable but not generally required. Self-improvement is a laborious task50, one that
imposes certain expectations on a moral agent. Though it can be used as a reason for
violating some other moral rule in significant enough instances, it is not a task that in and
of itself must produce action. Public policy, on the other hand, must always use selfimprovement no matter what dilemma it involves itself in and must always produce
action. The very fabric of public policy relies on betterment- policy shapes America so
that it can be its best possible self. Healthcare reform, taxes, legal precedents etc. all are
working towards a harmonious society. Self- improvement, then, is a moral ideal used in
each and every instance of policy making. In contrast, no one ideal or rule is used every
time a person weighs potential moral outcomes. This draws one difference between the
agent and public policy in their dealings with pro tanto principles. There is no weight
with the agent- no one principle is every time more important than the other, as selfimprovement is for government.
Earlier, I argued that self -improvement as a moral rule for the agent imposes
some kind of laboriousness that isn’t required. In public policy this is not the case-

Beneficence and self-improvement don’t act the same here because beneficence is
doing an additive good, and self-improvement is acting in the direction of good (rather
than stagnating or acting in the direction of bad).
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formulating policy that betters the nation isn’t laborious it just is a part of the process. If
it weren’t to be done, then public policy would be pointless.
Reputation- A New Principle
Self- Improvement is an intrinsic good for the government and is why public
policy even exists. Reputation, a new principle, is how public policy can continue to exist
in a productive manner. Acting in a way that would prevent the continued existence of
something that, at its heart, aims to promote good, would be a violation.
Public policy should also include reputation because it includes the maintenance
of a good image. America must act in a way that shows it is worthy of being a part of the
world. It must enter peace accords, help neighbors, and exhibit some amount of cordiality
in its global interactions. In doing this, America is able to remain a power that is capable
of affecting more change, and thus more goodness (for its citizens, and for the world as a
whole that it is a part of). If America completely destroyed its international reputation by
committing genocide, and losing the respect of all other nations, then it is possible that it
would lose out on lucrative trade deals and positive relationships. Without this, the
country would have less opportunity to act on other moral principles and ideals, and
would even end up violating more moral principles and ideals more often.
The individual doesn’t operate as a figure that needs to consistently make moral
statements under the scrutiny of others. If they commit wrong, they do so
microscopically, and because of this, their actions typically hold less weight than wrong
done in public policy which can have domestic and international repercussions.
Preserving reputation is a means to an end, with the end being more principles
proactively preserved. Additionally, since scrutiny is inescapable, maintaining a good
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reputation is beneficial for modeling proper behavior (for the moral agent, for the
American government, and for international ones)
For the agent, preserving reputation would maybe secure goodness for the self by
means of pleasure. For the government, preserving reputation would mean securing
future goodness for the selves within so that potentially depraved persons could be more
benefitted. Consider enacting a policy that could cause serious international scandal but
would be most in line with the majority of the population at the time. It might be the case
that, when this moral dilemma arises, the government’s homage to their own population
(social consensus) is more incumbent. Or it might be the case that preserving reputation
is more incumbent, because that would mean that more acts in the future could occur
which would benefit America’s own population.
Stability – A new principle
In the discussion before, the moral agent’s own source of pleasure and selfimprovement aren’t necessary principles in the weighing of moral conflicts. This seems
to be different in the case of the government, as seen by how incumbent the role of selfimprovement and beneficence are. In addition to maintaining a good global image, the
government must preserve its own health by maintaining a fiscal stability that allows it to
continue to exist and act on its moral schema. By engaging in harmful economic policies,
even if they are for the welfare of the citizens, the government will be sacrificing its own
health. This is where monetary concerns come into play- stability is also a principle that
will always be weighed. Will said policy move put the country in an unsalvageable state?
If so, perhaps the beneficence of the move isn’t as incumbent as the stability. Stability is
included for the continuance of the state, either in the monetary sense or the actual one.
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Security - A new principle
The American entity is tasked with making sure that its citizens are safe. This is
why so many resources are used on self-defense, governmental agency, etc. The right to
privacy is sometimes breached, and so America must do what it can to protect its citizens.
Of course, this comes at a cost. When airport security requires flyers to go through
extensive security measures, they are employing this principle of security. They are
depriving persons of their freedom while they are doing it, though. Especially in the case
of random TSA checks, where people are sometimes invasively felt up in order to
continue on. Data collection on the individuals social security numbers, etc. all seem to
serve a purpose that is correct, though the way in which it is dealt with often encounters
error.51
Security can justify certain behaviors on the governments’ behalf. The purpose of
incapacitation is to isolate wrongdoers from society, so that they do not commit more
wrong. The government deprives people of freedom, for general security. Similarly,
when extremely personal data is collected, the government justifies it as a security
measure. If this data collection helps to prevent an act of terrorism, or informs the
government in a way that perpetuates our safety, then this principle might be able to
override the deprivation of freedom.
Principle Overview
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One problem with some security measures, like the one in the airport example, has to
do with racial profiling. Public policy has a duty to reparation, which includes acting in a
way that recognizes America’s deep racial history
59

Even though public policy acts similar to the moral agent in some ways within the
individual duties, there are many other considerations because of the breadth of
government’s power. The small nuances in each duty collectively make great changes
when paired together, thus making the application of pro tanto principles in public policy
succinctly different and more difficult. In both Gert and Ross’ framework, even the
simplified version we discussed contains no principle regarded as more incumbent than
another. But with public policy, self-improvement is the most incumbent principle, with
the nation being regarded as the self. Some principles, such as reparation act quite
differently, and in the case of stability, there are some principles that have failed to be
considered at all in Ross’, Gert’s, and our amalgamated accounts.
It is not just irrational for policymakers to not act beneficently or justly, as was
argued with the moral agent, it is immoral. For them to not act in ways that is in
accordance with the needs of the population, who desire goodness and fairness,
policymakers become subject to punishment. This is often in the form of not being reelected or severely criticized (and in the worst cases, overthrown), but is still evident.
Morally Relevant Features
In Gert’s Common Morality, he mentions the government a few times and thus
points to instances where considerations about public policy might be relevant. In his
moral rule, ‘do not deprive of freedom,’ he talks about the government’s specific
authority to deprive freedoms. In his eighth morally relevant feature, there is a question
of whether or not a certain other action or policy would be preferable. His sixth morally
relevant feature similarly references the government and how certain occupations, like
police, may have in committing a violation (their job description entails it). All of these
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contribute to how Gerts framework is able to apply to public policy. However, there are a
few features, in light of the differences discussed within the principles that can be added.
The morally relevant features Gert includes will help guide policymakers in their
decision-making, but here are a few suggested additions.
1. Does the violation target one certain population? Does that violation make a
moral statement?
One large difference between the moral agent and public policy is scale.
Moral agents only have relationships with a few select others, but every moral
agent has a relationship with the government. And the government has a
relationship with every moral agent. Will everyone be affected negatively or
positively if the violation occurs? Or will a small/ succinct group have to receive
the harm of the violation?
Numbers are not as important with the individual as they are in public
policy. It might be more right to enact a policy that helps a group of people and
minutely harms everyone (i.e. causing taxes to be higher). Or it might be more
right to enact a policy that minutely benefits everyone and only harms a small
group of people. This case is trickier, though, because the effect might be viewed
as targeted (either intentionally or by neglect.) In this case, the next morally
relevant feature should be considered.
2. How vulnerable is the population to whom the rule is being violated?
The more vulnerable the population, the less the violation should be
allowed. Vulnerability should be noted as a term that is not in any way
demeaning. Rather, vulnerability is it is a term that accounts for the positionality
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of members in a society in accordance with the way society treats them (to no
fault of their own). Vulnerability, as it is used here, can be determined by a
variety of factors that include:
Social Standing- One way to assess social standing is to see what members
of the population occupy positions of power, have full access to their rights, and
are treated justly. Men disproportionately occupy positions of
power(governmentally, and in the corporate world) and so if a violation were to
harm women(less access to reproductive rights) and benefit men then policy
makers can easily discern between who has higher social standing.
Up until 2008, members of the LGBTQ community didn’t have full access
to their rights, and this affected their social standing in America. Policy
movements that effect this community in particular should be considered, as the
consequences might be that the group feels more targeted or societally subjugated.
In order to signify that these groups have gained the equality that legislation
supports, policies should consider these attributes.
Inmates have no voting rights and have infamously been treated
inhumanely. Since they have been violators in the past, this might make it seem
more admissible to allow violations. The opposite might be true though, and they
might be unjustly subordinated due to their social stigmatization. The realization
that all people, including inmates, are human should be considered when enacting
policies.
Age- Senior citizens and children should be considered more vulnerable
populations. Because of this, enacting policies that target elementary education or
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children in general, should be considered heavily. Children are not considered
moral agents because they don’t have the same decision making abilities their
older counterparts do. They are more vulnerable due to their neurological
formativeness, and overall impressionability.
Additionally, children are quite literally the fabric of the future. In an
analysis of potential policy enactment, the government should realize its
relationship with time is similar to children (there’s more of it). Improving the
lives of children, will be the improvement of the society as a whole and will
coincide with the principle of stability.
Senior Citizens should also be considered in regards to age. They have
been productive members of the society that we all engage in and now may be
less able in a variety of ways. Plans for their retirement and continued welfare
after they have completed their most active capitalist role in society, should occur.
If a policy helps or harms them, this should be considered.
Physical Ability- The world is not built in deep consideration for people
who don’t have a good amount of physical agency. They have less physical access
to a large part of the resources public policy intends to provide. Because of this,
they should be considered more than persons who do not have this physical
impediment. This will help improve a condition that is not at present optimal.
Mental Ability- Policies should accommodate to features regarding mental
illnesses and there should generally be a basic psychological understanding of
how groups that have cognitive deficits interact with the world. When weighing a
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principle that will harm this group in particular, considerations should be made
for the capabilities they lack.
Historical Standing- If a policy move violates a certain group of people
that have been historically disenfranchised, this should be considered. It is within
America’s moral duty, and is a part of reparation, to not continue the behaviors
they have been prone to in the past. A policy that involves relocating Native
Americans would be of a different moral sort, after consideration of our history,
than a policy that involves relocating a random group of Californians.
Veteran Status – If the policy recommendation results in a violation
against a group of veterans, this should be a morally relevant consideration.
Seeing that harming this certain group would also violate the principle of
gratitude.
In consideration of these relevant characteristics, public policy will be able
to follow moral ideals rather than utilitarian ones. Of course, everyone in a society
is able to have his/her life improved in some way. There are some groups, though,
where this ability becomes a need. It is important to identify when this is a need,
and when having more goodness is not a need. The former should receive more
urgency in consideration.
3. Is the violation a violation that would be regarded by other (progressive)
countries as justified? Does it meet the standards of a social consensus
internationally?
Just as moral agents look to other moral agents and how they would view
justifications, policymakers should look at other policies and see how they view
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things. Progressive countries will be the ones that uphold the same values about
race, creed, color, gender and sexuality.
If a violation is usually allowed or not allowed internationally, this should be a
factor in America. One example would be basic healthcare, and the how some
European countries would regard our treatment of human rights to be a violation.

Conclusion: Balancing Pro Tanto Principles
In terms of actually balancing principles, it seems that public policy can use the
frameworks provided by Gert and Ross. The two step- justification process will work,
with the modification of what the principles mean, what they are, and how the morally
relevant features are dealt with.
When a public policy is being formulated, the most important duty, which should
be weighed at all times is to improve the self. This moral ideal in Gerts version will move
to being a moral rule. If public policy acts in a way that is ideologically regressive and
seeks to self-damage, then that will prove to be reprehensible (unlike other moral ideals).
Public policy should try its very best to keep its promises to citizens. In a practical
sense, though, the government is not accountable if they don’t fulfill certain promises.
This is because of its unique relationship with time, resources and emergencies. For this
reason, fidelity should be moved to a moral ideal.
All other principles should act, within the binary of moral ideals and moral rules,
the same. When faced with dilemmas that sacrifice the needs of one group of individuals,
morally relevant features should be assessed through the first step of the two step process.
In addition, in order to account for the relationships between people (and governments)

65

like Ross wanted, vulnerabilities should be assessed. After all, public policy should act
more so on moral ideals than utilitarian ones. That is, it should aim to provide goodness
to the lives of those that are depraved. Utilitarian ideals should be secondary to this, in
which goodness is added to the lives that are already good. This is why vulnerabilities
should be assessed, they make certain populations more in need of good than in want of
good.
Once vulnerabilities are assessed and the first step is completed, the second step
of estimating the consequences of allowing or not allowing the violation should occur.
This can be done more empirically than on the thought the individual moral agent has to
rely on. Social consensus can be obtained within the country on what policy moves are
acceptable and desirable.52 Social consensus among progressive countries can too be
assessed when looking at these factors. Then, the government will have to decide the
consequences of letting everyone know the violation was or wasn’t allowed. Unlike the
moral agent, it’s very likely everyone will know the violation was or wasn’t allowed.
America will make a moral statement each time it makes a policy move, and so must do
each move cautiously. How will citizens react if their freedom is severely deprived for
the sake of preserving security? Are the consequences of this inevitably widespread
knowledge of the violation worth committing the action? The tools given in this paper
should help guide the answers to this question and ones that are similarly problematic.

52

Alternative tax laws can be measured quite intelligently, through voter consensus and
mature cost benefit analyses.
66

Bibliography
Albert R. Jonsen, Mark Siegler, William J. Winslade. “Chapter 2: Patient Preferences.” in
Clinical Ethics: A Practical Approach to Ethical Decisions in Clinical Medicine, 7th
edition. Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, McGraw-Hill Medical.
Dworkin, Gerald. “Paternalism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. February 12,
2017. Accessed December 09, 2018. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism/.
Gert, Bernard. Common Morality: Deciding What to Do. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2007
Planned Parenthood. “How Federal Funding Works at Planned Parenthood.” Planned
Parenthood Action Fund. Accessed December 08, 2018.
https://www.istandwithpp.org/defund-defined/how-federal-funding-works-plannedparenthood.
Ross, William D. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002.

67

